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VICO, LLEWELLYN, AND THE TASK OF LEGAL
EDUCATION
Francis J. Mootz, III

I. INTRODUCTION
How does legal education fail students? This question invites a book,
but this Article focuses on a particular pedagogical deficiency. Put simply,
legal education is too text-bound, and it approaches texts in a manner that is
far too circumscribed and simplistic.
This Article argues that legal
education suppresses law's rhetorical roots and that this failure leaves
students unprepared for the rhetorical demands of legal practice. Students
do not learn that legal texts are rhetorical instruments, nor do they learn that
legal rhetoric encompasses more than just textual expression. Legal
education fails students because it is insufficiently rhetorical. This Article
draws inspiration from an oration delivered by Giambattista Vico three
hundred years ago and from an aside in a short, provocative essay published
seventy-five years ago by Karl Llewellyn. In the wake of the recent
Carnegie Report on the legal profession and legal education, the time is ripe
to renew the unheeded calls by Vico and Llewellyn for a legal education
that is rhetorical in nature.
II. LA W'S NEGLECT OF RHETORIC
Law is a specialized rhetorical discourse, but lawyers tend not to
understand the full depth of this reality. Too many lawyers regard law as a
system of "given" narratives operating within a rigid semiotic economy,
failing to recognize that law is a dynamic system that is constantly under
construction. This failure is explained partly by their desire for law to be
real, objective, and enduring. An unfortunate result of this desire is that
lawyers too readily resign themselves to making only technical
interventions and engaging in instrumentalist strategies, parroting bits of the
dominant narratives in response to certain discrete problems. This approach
often is sufficient to permit them to achieve their clients' objectives, and so
these instrumental efforts pay very well. Well-paid lawyers tend not to ask
too many questions. Consequently, the law's rhetorical dimension is, at
best, misunderstood by lawyers who equate it with showmanship and
135
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stylistic flourish; more likely is that rhetoric is wholly ignored.
Why do lawyers understand their practice in such a shallow manner,
and how can legal education correct this inadequacy? By framing the
question we already find a general, initial answer. Most lawyers would
regard rhetorical theory as an exotic discipline that has no relevance to the
real world of lawyering. And, if fancy rhetorical theory is unable to help
win a case or to succeed in a negotiation, lawyers will see little benefit to
learning about what appears to be merely an academic dalliance. It makes
no sense to challenge shallow self-understanding with sophisticated
academic theories when the practice at hand appears not to require
theoretical guidance.
There are two general responses to this anti-intellectualism. First, one
might argue that lawyers will become better lawyers if they understand
rhetoric, even if there is no rhetorical methodology that can be studied,
memorized, and then applied in legal practice. Second, one might claim
that the lawyer's avowed instrumentalism is the very problem to be
addressed and then suggest that the insights of rhetorical theory can assist
one in understanding why lawyers suffer from this malady. The first
response tends to affirm the instrumental and reductivist approach to law,
which is the principal problem; therefore, it threatens to undermine the
possibility for the second response. This Article principally addresses the
second point, but also suggests that this critical approach indirectly sheds
light on how law professors might improve legal education to educate more
effective lawyers, once they have broadened their notion of effectiveness
beyond instrumentalism.
III. VICO'S INGENIOUS METHOD OF RHETORICAL
EDUCATION
Giambattista Vico was a "professor of rhetoric in eighteenth-century
Naples" and "is customarily regarded as the most original thinker in the
1
Italian philosophical tradition ." Vico's most famous oration was delivered
at the commencement of the academic year at the University of Naples in
1708 and published the following year. The scope of On the Study Methods
of Our Time2 is breathtaking: with the Cartesian "critical method" rapidly
gaining ascendance in intellectual circles, Vico argued on behalf of the
humanistic tradition in a manner that was neither ill-informed nor atavistic.
He fully appreciated the power of the Cartesian method, but he also
I. DAYID L. MARSHALL,VJCO AND THE TRANSFORMA
TJON OF RHETORIC IN EARLY
MODERNEUROPEI (20 I 0).
v,co, ON THE STUDY METHODSOF OUR TIME (Elio Gianturco trans .,
2. GIAMBATTISTA
Cornell Univ. Press 1990) (1709) [hereinafter STUDYMETHODS).
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anticipated that its power would prove to be overbearing, extending beyond
its narrow range of proper application. He conceded that one must embrace
the new rationalism, but that one should do so only without sacrificing
3
ancient wisdom. Vico's lament was not that lawyers have abandoned a
glorious intellectual past, but that they have failed to fulfill the intellectual
promise of the future . It is no overstatement to say that, at the dawn of the
modem rationalist era, Vico foresaw that lawyers would lose their ingenuity
and become technocrats managed by legal narratives instead of .exercising
their rhetorical roles as managers of meaning.
Vico began his oration with a reminder that all human knowledge is
partial and fallible, and that every person must always be ready to assess
4
one's beliefs and to correct them. However, he exhorted his audience to
recognize that Cartesian radical doubt undermines not only false beliefs that
should be discarded, but also beliefs grounded in the probable, without
5
which no one could live. The critical method undermines the cultivation of
common sense, which subtends both practical judgment and eloquence,
6
thereby restricting knowledge to an arid and abstract intellectualism. It is
important to stress that Vico did not seek to abandon the Cartesian method
in favor of a return to ancient rhetoric. Instead, he counseled a prudent
understanding of the role that each can play: "a severely intellectualistic
7
criticism enables us to achieve truth, while ars topica makes us eloquent,"
concluding "[ e Jach procedure, then has its defects. The specialists in topics
fall in with falsehood; the philosophical critics disdain any traffic with
8
probability. "
Vico argued that relentless criticism leaves no room for the rhetorical
arts, but it is only in rhetorical engagement that one can deal with questions
that admit of no definitive answer. The law purports to seek certainty, but
when this goal is understood to mean "truth" in the sense of the Cartesian
method it becomes a debilitating straitjacket for legal practice.

3. As described by Elio Ginaturco,
[Vico J sets the seal of a philosophical conclusion upon the Quarrel of the Ancients and the
Modems. Vico draws , so to speak, the final balance-sheet of the great controversy; not only
that, but transposes it to a ground where the problem posited can receive a solution. He is a
reconciler of the two factions ; he lifts their debate to a high philosophical plane, he rises to
the concept of a modem culture harmonizing the scientific with the humani stic aspects of
education.
Elio Ginaturco , Translator's Introdu ction to STUDY METHODS, supra note 2, at xxiii-xxiv.
4 . STUDY M ETHODS, supra note 2 , at 1-12 .

5. Indeed , if a per son were to try to live life by utilizing only Cartesian reasoning she would
be incapable of action and most likely would be regarded as having a serious mental disturb ance.
6 . STUDY METHODS, supra note 2, at 13 .

7. Id. at 17.
8. Id. at 19.
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Nature and life are full of incertitude; the foremost, indeed, the only
aim of our [rhetorical] "arts" is to assure us that we have acted
rightly .... Those who know all the loci, i.e., the lines of argument to
be used, are able (by an operation not unlike reading the printed
characters on a page) to grasp extemporaneously the elements of
persuasion inherent in any question or case....
In pressing, urgent
affairs, which do not admit of delay or postponement, as most
frequently occurs in our law courts . .. it is the orator's business to
give immediate assistance .... Our experts in philosophical criticism,
instead, whenever they are confronted with some dubious point, are
9
wont to say: "Give me some time to think it over!"
Rhetoric is unavoidable just because life is uncertain . The Cartesian
philosopher vainly seeks to determine the truth of the matter and therefore
is impotent when faced with a choice between two proposed courses of
action that are equally valid from a logical perspective. In contrast, one
who is capable of determining the relevant arguments "for and against" the
proposed action on the basis of the probabilities of the given circumstances,
and is then able to persuade others as to the best approach, exhibits a
wisdom that is far superior for this task than the more limited scope of
definitive truth.
Vico provocatively compared the ability to "grasp extemporaneously"
the lines of argument to "reading the printed characters on a page."
Lawyers speak colloquially about "reading a situation," but Vico urged us
to take this metaphor to a deeper level. The abstract characters that form a
written language are capable of generating an infinite number of
expressions as speakers combine them in new and inventive ways over
time. Reading social situations is not an unmediated perceptual facility to
recognize brute facts; rather, it is an art that develops over time as one
develops familiarity with the commonplaces that can be deployed in
creative ways. An education in eloquence is an education in arraying lines
of argument inventively to respond to the situation , and this art rests on
ingenuity in "seeing" which arguments best match the situation. The sage
understands that this capacity is distinct from philosophical criticism, and is
not so foolish as to "apply to the prudent conduct of life the abstract
10
criterion of reasoning that obtains in the domain of science."
Vico insisted that the art of making arguments through an inventive
use of commonplaces "is by nature prior to the judgment of their validity,"
and so the art of rhetoric should be granted priority over critical analysis

9. STUDY METHODS, supra note 2, at 15 .

10. Id. at 35.
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11

One must first locate the means of
rather than being suppressed.
persuasion within a given situation before it is even possible to test the
reasoning with philosophical criticism. Even more importantly, not all
prudential decisions can or should be subjected to second-guessing by the
philosopher.
Many of life's issues simply are not amenable to
philosophical analysis in the Cartesian tradition; instead, they call for
mature judgment that Vico identified with the ancient rhetorical tradition.
There are three humanistic capabilities that Vico championed, despite the
vigorous Cartesian criticism that their uncertain bases introduces the
possibility of error : (I) the ingenuity of finding similarities among
seemingly different factors; (2) the imaginative capacity to create a new
understanding of reality; and (3) the prudence to choose appropriately when
the matter is not subject to calculation . The sage must not only be
committed to truth, but also be ready to act when the frailties of the human
condition preclude an analysis that demonstrates the truth of the matter.
The sage,
through all the obliquities and uncertainties of human actions and
events, keeps his eye steadily focused on eternal truth, manages to
follow a roundabout way whenever he cannot travel in a straight line,
and makes decisions, in the field of action, which, in the course of
12
time, prove to be as profitable as the nature of things permits.
These considerations lead directly to Vico's recommendations for
organizing education. Building on the oration delivered in the previous
13
year, Vico insisted that students must first develop their rhetorical skills
before being introduced to philosophical criticism . Vico feared that the
student might lose forever the capacity for ingenuity, imagination, and
eloquence if exposed to the abstract intellectualism of the Cartesian method
without first cultivating the humanistic arts. In a detailed discussion of law
and legal education, Vico brought his thesis to bear in very concrete ways.
He recounted the emergence of law as a distinct discipline . The Greeks
regarded law as a site of the activity of conjoining philosophy and oratorical
14
skills. Similarly, the Romans strictly maintained written laws, but utilized
15
legal fictions that were generated by the orator to avoid injustice.
By
Vico's time, though, the law had expanded beyond the stark written text
and enveloped within itself the moderating force of equity as a matter of
11. STUDYMETHODS,supra note 2, at 14.
12. Id. at 35 .
13. GIAMBAITISTAVICO, On the Proper Order of Studies, in ON HUMANISTIC
EDUCATION
(SIX INAUGURAL
ORATIONS
, 1699-1707) 123, 125-40 (Giorgio A. Pinton & Arthur W . Shippee
trans., 1993).
14. STUDYMETHODS
, supra note 2, at 49 .
15. Id. at 50-52.
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16

The law now claims the mantel of justice, which represents both a
positive development and a loss; although the law had become directly
equitable, Vico argued that the connection between law and eloquenceunderstood as wisdom speaking appropriately to the given situation-had
become obscured. Vico regarded it as a clear advantage that "the
professions of legal expert and orator are, in our age, joined in the same
17
person," but as justice was absorbed into law it became too easy for
private parties to manipulate the levers of legal authority for their own gain
without any check or limit. It was this decay of eloquence in favor of the
18
pursuit of self-interest, Vico emphasizes, that sealed Rome's fate. The
law had become a self-sufficient discourse that was susceptible to technical
manipulation because there is no external discourse to which it must answer
through rhetorical argumentation. The problem facing eighteenth-century
European society, he believed, was the need to bring legal doctrine back
19
into contact with eloquence and practical wisdom.
One might wonder if Vico's reference to law and legal education in
the oration is wholly happenstance, such that the musings of this
eighteenth-century rhetorician might appear to have no intrinsic connection
to law. In fact, Vico was educated in law, sought a Chair on the law
faculty, wrote one of his early works on law, and rooted his thinking in
20
legal reasoning and eloquence.
Donald Kelley's reading of Vico leads
him to suggest that the modem "social and cultural sciences seem to be the
21
ghosts of dead jurisprudences" as capaciously understood by Vico, and it
was jurisprudence as a "human system of moral, social, and political
thought . . . rather than the tradition of Greek, scholastic, or Cartesian
metaphysics that provided Vico with his principal model and central
22
ideas." In a similar assessment, Michael Mooney emphasizes that Vico's
conception of "rhetoric" was "not a literary but judicial rhetoric-rhetoric
16.
17.
18.
19.

STUDYMETHODS,supra note 2, at 59 .

Id. at 62 .
Id. at 69.
Id. at 69-70.

20. A succinct biography of Vico is provided in PATRICIABIZZELL& BRUCEHERZBERG,THE
RHETORICALTRADITION:READINGSFROMCLASSICALTIMESTO THEPRESENT862-64 (200 l ).
21. Donald R . Kelley, In Vico Veritas: The True Philosophy and the New Science , 43 Soc .
RES. 601,611 (1976).
22 . Donald R. Kelley, Vico 's Road: From Philology to Jurisprudence and Back, in
GIAMBATTISTAVICO'S SCIENCEOF HUMANITY 15, 27 (Girogio Tagliacozzo & Donald Phillip
Verene eds., 1976). Kelley concludes that the "debts owed by Vico to jurisprudence are
incalculable and in some cases almost indemonstrable .. . for they involve matters not only of
content but of form and method , not only exempla but, much more significantly , also principia of
human behavior." Id. at 19.
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as argumentation, a process of reasoning," and that his New Science was
premised on the belief that the principles of argumentative discourse
provide access to the origin of humanity and undermine the intellectualist
fantasy expressed by the Cartesian critical method.23 Law is not just an
example of one practice among many for Vico. Law is the practice in
which one's civic life is born and renewed, and it is of central importance to
24
Vico's philosophy.
Vico's oration speaks directly to the question that motivates this
Article. A technocratic approach to law and legal education suppresses the
imagination and intellectual virtues necessary to practice law in a manner
that genuinely unites eloquence-which Vico defines as "wisdom, ornately
and copiously delivered in words appropriate to the common opinion of
25
mankind" -with the re-fashioning of legal doctrine to address the case at
hand. Legal hermeneutics has supplanted rhetoric, but many contemporary
theorists remain ignorant of the rhetorical core of legal hermeneutics.
Consequently, we find legal hermeneutics devolving into a deductiveempirical exercise of identifying the "original meaning" intended by the
drafters or the "plain meaning" of the legal text. The law now includes
justice within its scope, but a methodological hermeneutics that seeks
certainty in the application of the law suppresses this dimension of legality.
As a result, lawyers devolve into the mouthpieces of a voiceless wisdom
that are equipped only to manipulate legal formulae.
Vico's "ingenious method"-studying
topics and learning how to
persuade others in a situation of uncertainty-is a recommendation to use
one's common sense to imagine new solutions to problems, to "see" a new
path of persuasion by drawing connections that are not already recognized.
A well-chosen metaphor does just that. It carries a meaning from one
situation to a new situation, seemingly instantaneously, as if one suddenly
26
sees something that previously had been hidden from view.
The ingenious faculty assumes the important function of supplying
arguments which the rational process itself is not capable of
"finding" . . . . But it is exclusively on the basis of revealing common
23. MICHAELMOONEY, VICO IN THE TRADITIONOF RHETORIC,at xiii, 82-83 (1985).
24. For discussions on the centrality of law to Vico's thinking , see Francis J. Mootz , III,
Recalling Vico 's Lament: The Role of Prudence and Rhetoric in Law and Legal Education, 83
CHJ.-KENTL. REV. 1097 (2008).
25 . STUDYMETHODS,supra note 2, at 78.
26 . The original meaning of "metaphor" was to physically carry an item from one place to
another, but gradually it came to be used "metaphorically " as a transfer of meaning that Aristotle
recognized as being foundational to education because it generated knowledge not through a chain
of deductions that might fail but rather through immediate insight. ERNESTOGRASSI, RHETORJC
AS PHILOSOPHY94-95 ( 1980).
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elements that a transfer can be made, and that is why Vico defines the
ingenious faculty as a requisite for metaphorical thought. ... Based on
the ingenious faculty, which establishes relationships or common
factors, imagination, according to Vico, confers meanings on sense
perceptions. Through its transfers, imagination is the original faculty
of "letting see" (phainestai), so that Vico calls it "the eye of the
.
.
,,27
mgemum.
It is necessary to exercise the imagination through topical
argumentation because there is no substitute for the accumulation of
experience. One cannot become prudent by declaring answers to practical
problems by means of deduction; one becomes prudent through the exercise
of judgment based on "insight," which is really a "new sight" or a "broader
view." To express this metaphorically , consider how it is possible to
improve one's eyesight by using one's eye in a certain manner-such as
using a patch on one eye to force the other eye to focus properly-but one
can be sure that reading about the biological structure of one's optical
sensations will not improve this capacity. Vico urged his contemporaries to
recognize the fact that the ingenious capacity of students can be improved
28
through proper education-an education in the liberal arts.
Rhetorical
education is a matter of gaining experience by exercising one's rhetorical
capabilities, rather than through cognitive achievement.

Vico's oration relates to law directly and not just superficially . Seen

27. Ernesto Grassi, The Priority of Common Sense and the Imagination: Vico 's Philosophi cal
Relevanc e Today, 43 Soc. RES. 553, 562 (1976) (quoting De antiquissima Jtalorum spaientia, in
Opere I : 184-185).
28. Michael Mooney makes this point vividly:
Ingenuity, Vico says repeatedly, is the "faculty of bringing together things that are disparate
and widely separated." It lays no claim to thoroughness or method, but is a capacity, as
Petrarch had said of it, which is quick and decisive, penetrating and acute, ready and
adaptive. One does not need to call on ingenuity; one either has it or does not, sees
connections or misses them utterly. Vico was a child of acute ingenuity, he claimed, and so,
too, are children generally, if only we will recognize it and train them accordingly. For
ingenuity depends on the images of fantasy, a faculty most vivid and robust in youth, and on
the power of memory, fantasy's twin, and they in tum take their start in sensations, the
images of sense. But the point is more subtle than it seems, for sense and memory are not to
be thought of as mere passive capacities, receiving and retaining impressions that
imagination and ingenuity subsequently work through; sense, memory, imagination, and
ingenuity are four virtually indistinguishable aspects of the single, prediscursive action of the
mind.
. . . Ingenious perception is truly an invention, an assembling and arranging of images
that produces a genuinely novel vision .... [In) oratory and law, it is a vision of how things
should be, a course of action that will set things right or avoid their deterioration, a vision
that joins past to future through current expectations, thus achieving plausibility, but one that
does so through images that are familiar and foreign alike, thus opening to us new ways.
Such images are those of metaphor, language that is sententious and acute.
MOONEY,supra note 23, at 151, 153.
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within the context of his life's work, the oration is premised on a view of
knowledge and human understanding that confronts the Cartesian critical
approach at the deepest philosophical levels rather than merely suggesting
that different educational methodologies might be employed . Vico's
ingenious method-training students in the art of argumentation-develops
the capacity of their imagination to see the world in new ways . This is not
just training students to learn rhetorical tricks that can be mastered and then
packed into the lawyer's toolkit for later use. Instead, Vico's educational
program was designed to facilitate the student's ability to enter and move
about a semiotic realm by exercising their rhetorical competencies.
Contemporary lawyers are particularly in need of such an education because
they must negotiate the symbolic order of law through rhetorical
engagement with others, a situation that became all too apparent in
twentieth-century America.
IV. LLEWELLYN'S REALIST ACCOUNT OF THE RHETORICAL
DIMENSION OF LAW
In the manner of Vico's oration, Karl Llewellyn famously addressed
the entering students at Columbia Law School in the 1920s with a lecture
meant to inspire as much as to orient. Llewellyn urged the students to
immerse themselves in law, not for the purpose of losing themselves to a
technical discipline, but to enable them to recognize that law addresses the
entire "drama of society" so that they would embrace the unity of
29
profession, culture , and society. A short time later, exactly 225 years after
Vico's address, Llewellyn suggested-in what appears to be a throwaway
footnote, exhibiting his customary florid prose-that he was principally
concerned with uncovering the rhetorical nature of legal encounter with
social drama.
I still feel my wattles grow red as I recall the shock with which, as a
dyed-in-the-wool commercial lawyer, I met property phases of
mortgage law which left me gasping. "One system of precedent" we
may have, but it works in forty different ways. Some day, someone
will help the second year student orient himself. Nor does anyone
bother to present to him the difference between logic and persuasion,
nor what a man facing old courts is to do with a new vocabulary; in a
word, the game, in framing an argument, of diagnosing the peculiar
presuppositions of the hearers . I think the second year student is
entitled to feel himself aggrieved. Meanwhile, while we wait upon the
treading of the Angel, there is rushing in that calls for doing. Here is a

29. K.N. LLEWELLYN
, BRAMBLE
BUSH,141-44, 152-53 (1930).
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30

Llewellyn's wntmgs on legal education illuminate his understanding of
legal rhetoric.
The following year, Llewellyn issued a testy call for a dramatic
reorganization of legal education in response to the insights generated by
legal realism?
Deriding the Langdellian model because "it blinds, it
32
stumbles, it conveyor-belts, it wastes, it mutilates, and it empties[,]"
Llewellyn argued that legal education must prepare students to lead a full
and enriching professional life by educating them about the social context
in which law operates rather than just teaching abstract rules.33 Students
must understand legal rules in context if lawyering is to be something other
than algebraic manipulations divorced from the real-world effects of the
legal system, and it is precisely by understanding rules in context that one
recognizes their contingency and develops a critical perspective: "You
make critique inevitable, because the human content, once introduced, will
34
never be denied."
Llewellyn insisted that lawyers must have a liberal
education if they are to bring such critical insight to bear in legal practice.
At the end of his career, Llewellyn still was calling for the study of law as a
liberal art, grounded in a combination of technical proficiency and broader
. 35
l earnmg.
The aim of Llewellyn's "liberal education" is properly understood as
rhetorical competence. When he supplemented his Columbia orientation

30 . Karl N. Llewellyn , On Philosophy in Ameri can Law, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 205 , 205 n.*
(1934).
31. See generally K.N . Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education , 35
COLUM.L. REV. 651 (1935) [hereinafter So-Called Legal Education].
32 . Id. at 653. His conclusion is phrased in equally harsh terms : "Law school education, even
in the best schools , is, then , so inadequate, wasteful, blind and foul that it will take twenty years of
unremitting effort to make it half-way equal to its job ." Id. at 678.
33. Id. at 668-71.
34. Id. at 669 .
35. Karl N . Llewellyn, The Study of Law as a Liberal Art, Lecture (Delivered in 1960), in
JURISPRUDENCE:
REALISMIN THEORYAND PRACTICE375-94 (1962) [hereinafter Liberal Art].
Llewellyn challenged the growing belief that preparing students to practice law was inconsistent
with the research ideals of the university:
The truth, the truth which cries out, is that the good work, the most effective work, of the
lawyer in practice roots in and depends on vision, range, depth, balance, and rich humanitythose things which it is the function, and frequently the fortune, of the liberal arts to
introduce and indeed to induce. The truth is therefore that the best practical training a
University can give to any lawyer who is not by choice or unendowment doomed to be hack
or shyster-the best practical training, along with the best human training, is the study of
law, within the professional school itself, as a liberal art.
Id. at 3 76. Llewellyn also repeated his frequent insistence that law students read broadly and
deeply to acquaint themselves with the context in which law operates . Id. at 388-89 .
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lectures twenty years later, Llewellyn focused on the need to bridge the
practice-theory divide. He emphasized that the craft of law "cries out for
the development and teaching of its theory, as it does also for study by
36
doing in the light of that theory."
He named this needed approach
"Spokesmanship," deriving it from the theories first developed in ancient
37
Greece as "Rhetoric-in essence: the effective techniques of persuasion.''
Too often, Llewellyn argued, Spokesmanship has been cast too narrowly as
the ability to add ornament to legal argument as part of advocacy.
But "Spokesmanship" has come to be for me a more significant focus
than any of the above, including and profiting from the essence of each
of them while also reaching out to cover such matters as the values of
having buffers between contending principals or the differences
between the rival goals of victory and reconciliation or the problems
and obligations of leadership both in the small and in the large. In a
word, Spokesmanship with special attention to work on the legal side
seems to me to offer the wherewithal of a full-fledged theoreticalpractical discipline with cultural value equal to its professional
38
value .. ..
Spokesmanship is a rhetorical practice with both theoretical and practical
dimensions that can equip lawyers for the challenges of their profession.
Llewellyn's conception of legal rhetoric was central to his realist
philosophy, although some critics badly misread him as an ivory-tower
39
relativist who believed in law's absolute indeterminacy.
In fact,
Llewellyn found ample stability within the practice of law while at the same
40
time acknowledging room for critique and reform.
Llewellyn wrote that
the totality of the practice of law was one of the most "conservative and
inflexible" of social phenomena, and yet every case offered the opportunity
36. LLEWELLYN,supra note 29, at 185.
37. Id. Llewellyn explains :
There is a theory of advocacy, or spokesmanship, or rhetoric (which aspect lends the name is
immaterial}--a theory which has formed the basis of a liberal art since classic times; a
theory, moreover, which is empty and vain save as it builds on and with deep understanding
of the psychological and ethical nature of cause or of client, of tribunal or other addressee, of
society and of the law-governmental phase thereof.
Liberal Art , supra note 35 , at 382 .
38. LLEWELLYN
, supra note 29, at 186. This is his vision of a legal education in the tradition
of the liberal arts : attending to the rhetoric of lawyering in its broadest sense. Liberal Art, supra
note 36, at 389.
See KARL
39. Admittedly, Llewellyn provided enough ammunition to his critics.
LLEWELLYN,THE CASE LAw SYSTEM IN AMER1CA80 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans .,
Univ . of Chicago Press 1989) (originally published as Priijudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in
Amerika (1933) , based on lectures delivered in Germany in 1928-29) [hereinafter CASE LAW
SYSTEM].

40 . Dennis Patterson , Law 's Practic e, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 575 , 580-81 , 598-99 (1990) .
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Llewellyn
for the judge and lawyers to shift the direction of thinking .
anticipated the central tenet of contemporary legal hermeneutics by arguing
that the meaning of a legal rule is known only in its use and that using a rule
is always a reformulation of the rule (either by expansion or contraction),
even when the case feels like a simple matter of deductive reasoning.
Thus, the task of the judge is to reformulate the rule so that from then
on the rule undoubtedly includes the case or undoubtedly excludes it.
"To apply the rule" is thus a misnomer; rather, one expands a rule or
contracts it. One can only "apply" a rule after first freely choosing
either to include the instant case within it or to exclude the case from
it. ...
Matters are no different, only more sharply highlighted, when a
new case is such that one first must mull over whether to include it
within an existing category, or must choose which existing category to
include it in ....
For we all, lawyer not least, are mistaken about the nature of
language. We regard language as if words were things with fixed
content. Precisely because we apply to a new fact situation a wellknown and familiar linguistic symbol, we lose the feeling of newness
about the case; it seems long familiar to us. The word hides its
42
changed meaning from the speaker.
His message was philosophically radical, but he was no linguistic skeptic,
cultural nihilist, or political revolutionary. Llewellyn firmly believed that
lawyers qm and should be educated to move within the rhetorically-rich
narratives of law.
V. EDUCATING LAWYERS WITH INGENUITY AND
RHETORICAL SENSIBILITY
Drawing from Vico's oration and Llewellyn's legal philosophy one
can fashion a productive lens through which to view the rhetorical
dimensions of law and the resulting implications for legal education. Vico
wrote at a momentous time in the intellectual history of the West, and he
spoke with the conviction that his lessons were not effete academic theories
but instead concerned the possibility for the continued development of
43
Western culture. Scholars of his New Science might debate whether Vico
was a historical determinist, but there can be no mistake that he believed

41. CASE LAW SYSTEM, supra note 39, at I 1-12 .
42. Id. at 74- 75.
43 . G!AMBAITISTA VICO, THE NEW SCIENCE (Thomas G. Bergin & Max H. Fisch trans. , rev .
unabridged ed ., Cornell Univ . Press I 968) (I 744).
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firmly in the efficacy of human agency when he delivered On the Study
44
Methods of Our Time. Llewellyn also wrote at a momentous intellectual
moment, when the juridical forces of modernity had solidified an abstract
and formal approach to jurisprudence, and the nascent tremors of
postmodern thinking had just begun. In periods of great intellectual crisis
both thinkers displayed a sense of pragmatic urgency, working from deep
philosophical insight but remaining rooted in practical questions of
pedagogy.
Vico provides an ontology of legal rhetoric-an understanding of how
5
lawyers see the world and construct the worlct4-that simultaneously
recognizes human agency and rejects the hubristic claims of Enlightenment
reason. Vico regards the creative insight of the rhetor as an important factor
in the ongoing elevation of man out of nature, but he does not endorse a
crude humanist account of subjective agency that assumes that individuals
can rise above their cultural context and survey it as a geographer might.
He recognizes that persons exist in and through rhetorically-constructed
44 . STUDYMETHODS , supra note 2. I concur with Mark Lilla that the New Science can be
read as continuous with Vico's earlier oration.
If civilized Athens and mighty Rome were both undone by the "barbarism of
reflection," is there any hope of nations today escaping their fate? ... In his pre-scientific
works Vico's practical political teaching is clear enough: preserve the traditions and religious
customs by which divine providence directs you to the verum, forswearing the enticements of
modem enlightenment, and you shall be like Rome. But those earlier works treat only of
Rome's exemplary rise, ignoring her fall.
By studying the collapse of Rome at the end of her historical corso he now hopes to
unmask the forces that robbed her of those traditional strengths. Those lessons could then be
applied to European societies through the ricorso, which puts Europe in Rome's place and
reveals which of its "Roman" traditions must be defended against the new barbarization.
On this reading, the corso-ricorso doctrine is not a scientific doctrine. It is a prophecy,
a dramatic warning to modem Europe that she stands at the edge of an abyss. No reader has
come away from the final packed pages of the New Science without sensing their prophetic
rhetorical power. Just as in On Method, where he once called modem Europeans to revive
ancient education, Vico again seems to be calling Europe away from its modernity.
. . . His practical teaching is therefore relatively clear: societies wishing to maintain
their perfection must learn to strengthen all that is Roman within themselves, and direct all
that is Greek within them to serve these Roman virtues. Philosophy can retain a role in
maintaining this equilibrium, though only as the handmaiden of science and religion.
Philosophy must now choose to assist "common sense" rather than weaken it through
skepticism.
MARK LILLA, G.B. Vrco: THE MAKING OF AN ANTI-MODERN 217, 225-27 (1993).
45. I certainly do not propose to resuscitate Vico's ontology as he conceived it, which was
embedded within a religious cosmology that no longer holds sway. See Willem Witteveen ,
Reading Vico for the School of Law , 83 CH!.-KENT L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2008). My reading is in
the spirit suggested by Witteveen: "[I]t is impossible to draw lessons from the letter of the work;
we should rather look for its spirit, manifesting itself at the level of metaphor. ... Literalism in
interpreting a classic text is often the best way of misrepresenting the views of its author." Id.
This is just to say that I read Vico as a legal theorist rather than approaching him historically in an
effort to capture his worldview.
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narratives and that there is no human subject capable of willing meaning
into existence.
Even while warning against the hubris of seeking
knowledge of things divine in an effort to become wholly self-directing,
Vico insisted that one is capable of achieving knowledge of human affairs
and shaping them. In short, Vico propounded a rhetorical philosophy that is
closely tied to civic and political engagement, and by returning to Vico one
finds a starting point from which he may embark on a path that avoids the
Charybdis of "just playing" and the Scylla of endless self-consuming
deconstruction.
Vico's use of the metaphor of sight to describe rhetorical knowledge is
an illuminating trope for thinking about educating lawyers with rhetorical
sensibility. The goal of legal education should not be to instill knowledge
of legal rules or even to teach students how to "think like a lawyer."
Rather, legal education should be a formative experience through which
students come to inhabit a new world where they move about as one moves
about in a physical place. The ancient topics, loci communes, operated
literally as "common-places" in which a community resided and within
46
which members exhibited a "common sense."
It is important not to
misunderstand Vico's metaphor by assuming that one's senses are passive
receptors of abiding stimuli; to the contrary, seeing is an active engagement
with one's surroundings, an evolving ability to move within commonplaces
by exercising common sense. There is no abiding truth to be seen, but
rather arguments to be taken up by uniting imagination with eloquence .
Vico argued that one can develop lawyering "sight" through the
ingenious method of rhetorical instruction. By arguing both sides of a case
in response to a specific problem by working within the commonplaces,
students develop the capacity for the sophisticated semiotic activities of
lawyering. Law professors should conceive legal education as educating
students about how to make arguments that can never meet the strictures of
logical thinking, bringing to bear Aristotle's famous distinction between
47
rhetoric and dialectic.
For example, students must learn to deploy
metaphors in the course of legal argumentation to find the available lines of
argument for securing the adherence of their audience. A well-chosen
metaphor leads the hearer to a conclusion directly, as if she suddenly turned
her gaze to see something for the first time. In fact, of course, the
conclusion immediately in front of her eyes is predicated on a complex
body of tacit semiological knowledge and education that the rhetor draws

46 . See generally HANS-GEORGGADAMER,TRUTHANDMETHOD 19-30 (Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall trans. , 2d rev. ed. , Crossroad Publ 'g 1989) (1960).
47. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 25-36 [1354a-1355a]
(George A. Kennedy trans., 2d ed., 2007) .
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upon artfully and cannot be generated reliably by methodical manipulation.
Through the practice of using metaphors in the course of a legal education,
students begin to see the world differently with an aim of being able to lead
others to see the world differently as well.
Vico's teaching has gained new traction with the recent focus on
48
Steven Winter has
research into the metaphoric structure of cognition.
49
applied this research to the question of legal reasoning and argumentation,
arguing that it exrlains how legal reasoning can simultaneously be creative
5
and constrained. In a related vein, George Taylor extends Paul Ricoeur's
detailed work on metaphors and suggests that it provides the means to
address one of the most important questions in legal theory: the role of
51
creativity.
The notion of a metaphor as a way of being-a mode of
creative existence within the world that in tum gives us our world-literally
"fleshes out" Vico's insights into the cultivation of creative thinking. These
contemporary theorists reject the computational approach to reasoning and
instead locate reasoning in the primary metaphors that develop out of one's
corporeal existence and then, in tum, generate a complex and dynamic
"body" of concepts that operate metaphorically.52 These findings do not
48. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have combined to provide the most compelling
combination of cognitive studies and philosophy to describe this emerging field of study. See
generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORSWE LIVE BY (1980) ; GEORGE
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS
CHALLENGETO WESTERNTHOUGHT(1999).
49. STEVENL. WINTER,A CLEARINGIN THE FOREST:LAW, LIFE ANDMIND (2001).
50 . Winter provides a succinct summary of this point in a recent article :
In short, what our examination of these legal metaphors shows is that legal imagination
and constraint are not opposed qualities they are thought to be, but a single human process .
Metaphor, in other words, reintegrates us with ourselves. An appreciation of metaphorical
reason paradoxically (and, from the perspective of Western philosophy, "metaphorical
thought" is already paradoxical) reconcile s freedom and constraint as mutually constitutive .
Indeed, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, "without roots which it thrusts into the world, it would not
be freedom at all."
Steven L. Winter, Re-Embodying Law , 58 MERCER L. REV. 869 , 897 (2007) (quoting MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY,PHENOMENOLOGY
OF PERCEPTION456 (Colin Smith trans., 1962)).
51. George Taylor , Law and Creativity, in ON PHILOSOPHYANDAMERICANLAW 81 (Francis
1. Mootz , III ed ., 2009) .
52. The philosopher , Mark Johnson, explains that the computational mod el of reasoning is
being eclipsed by new research that reveals how "our conceptualization and reasoning are
grounded in our bodily experience and shaped primarily by patterns of perception and action ."
Mark L. Johnson , Mind, Metaphor, Law , 58 MERCER L. REV. 845, 846 (2007) . We reason
according to "image schemas" that arise from our embodied interaction with the environment , and
therefore have "highly determinate 's patial ' or 'bodily ' logics ." Id. at 855. "Once we have
primary metaphors " grounded in this embodied logic ,
we are off and running, so to speak. Through various types of blending and composition, we
develop vast coherent systems of metaphorically defined concepts ... . All of our most
impressive intellectual achievements- in physics, chemistry, biology, anthropology,
sociology, mathematics, logic, philosophy , religion, and art- involve irreducible and
indispensable conceptual metaphors. In other words , all of the key concepts in all of these
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generate a methodology of creative thinking and argumentation, but they do
53
explain how this capacity develops and works. Vico's suggested method
of education-the
cultivation
of ingenuity through rhetorical
argumentation-finds strong support in this contemporary work.
If there can be no methodology of metaphorical reasoning and legal
creativity, where does Vico's injunction lead? First, it should be recalled
that he does suggest an "ingenuous method," by which he means learning
the topics and engaging in argumentation. This is akin to conditioning
one's body for sports: one can deliberately fashion a plan to sharpen his
natural proclivities and skills so as to permit the body to perform in creative
ways in the heat of competition. In the context of legal education this same
conditioning is at work. The goal of legal education should not be to
fashion a rigorous and computational mindset but rather to lead students to
exercise their creative thinking in ways that permits them to begin
practicing and accumulating the experience that further cultivates their
ingenuity. When she begins practicing, a law student who memorizes
material and takes multiple choice tests is likely to feel as if she has been
placed at the starting line of a marathon without having so much as jogged
around the block during the previous three years.
The Carnegie Report appropriately lauds the Socratic method of
teaching in the first year of law school for establishing a base upon which
legal education can build lawyering competence. Many professors have
embraced the "problem method" in advanced law courses, which builds on
and extends the first year introduction to legal reasoning. The problem
disciplines are defined by multiple, often inconsistent, metaphors, and we reason using the
internal logic of these metaphors.
·
Id. at 864-65. This basis for our thinking explains how we are at once grounded in the world and
also capable of creatively reshaping our world.
There is a logic of our bodily experience that is imaginatively appropriated in defining our
abstract concepts and reasoning with them. Imaginative processes of this sort depend on the
nature of our bodies, our brains, and the patterns of our interactions with our environment.
Imagination-w hich is the soul of human thinking-is therefore constrained and orderly,
even though it can be flexible and creative in response to novel situations.
Id . at 846.
53. During a roundtable discussion about the metaphoric basis of legal reasoning , Mark
Johnson emphasized this point:
[I]t is very popular to have what I call the miracle theory of creativity. It just happens, and
there is no explaining it. Some people just do this. But for the most part, what you are doing
concerns something that Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier have argued extensively in their
book, The Way We Think, which is about conceptual blending. They show you a number of
different patterns by which people routinely can create creative conceptual blends. And you
do make use of these cognitive resources that you have. I want to urge that it is not that you
can predict when something creative can come about, but it is an appropriation of something
and seeing how it, or some certain sturctures, can apply to some other domain.
That is not an explanation of how to be creative, but at least it suggests that it's not a
miracle. It is not [that] this act is, like Richard Rorty would say, just a radical rupture.
Johnson , supra note 52, at I 024 .
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method expands the rhetorical demands on students by moving beyond the
self-contained world of an appellate opinion and working with multiple
54
sources to solve a new problem. In my Sales course, I provide text to
orient and focus the students and one or more judicial opinions to provide
background. The class session is devoted to a collaborative effort to bring
the Uniform Commercial Code to bear on written problems assigned in
advance of the class. The goal of the classroom experience is to model
effective rhetorical efforts and to prod students to engage in the effort to
solve a problem without an empirical or logical-deductive answer. In short,
I strive to create a forum in which legal rhetoric is modeled, practiced, and
refined.
Additionally, law professors can rethink the project of legal education
along the lines of Llewellyn's more concrete proposals. Llewellyn
recognized the centrality of rhetoric to law and called for a liberal arts
education in law to equip students with the training necessary to practice
law successfully. But Llewellyn also was a hard-nosed realist who
understood the institutional and historical realities of legal practice that
could not be overcome by rhetorical theories. "A liberal art can be as
liberal as you please, and it should be-any liberal art should be, including
law. But one thing, I repeat, sits firm: any man who proposes to practice a
55
liberal art must be technically competent. " The lawyer must know more
than dexterity with Socratic dialogue: she must understand the world and
how it works; she must appreciate the depth and complexity of the
problems facing individuals and entities that is only later summarized in a
few pages of the description of the "facts" in an appellate opinion; she must
appreciate that one of the "law-jobs" identified by Llewellyn is counseling
one's client, which is different from serving as a legal mouthpiece; she must
understand the background social mores against which people invoke
formal legal doctrine, appreciating the meaning of a handshake or the filing
of a lawsuit beyond their legally cognizable meaning.
Llewellyn was ahead of his time when arguing that legal education
should eschew a wholly cognitive approach and instead should embrace a
56
skills-oriented upper-class curriculum.
Even when discussing the

54. See FRANCISJ. MOOTZ, III ET AL , COMMERCIALCONTRACTING:SALES, LEASES AND
COMPUTERINFORMATION(2d ed. 2008) .
55. Liberal Art , supra note 36, at 380.
56. Kate Kruse properly notes that the Legal Realists did not advance a sophisticated approach
to clinical legal education. Katherine R. Kruse , Getting Real About Legal Realism, New Legal
Realism and Clinical Legal Education , N .Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) . Nevertheless,
Llewellyn was far ahead of his time when arguing for skills-based education, even if he rejected
Jerome Frank 's simplistic "immersion" conception ofa clinical law school for being insufficiently
theoretical. Id. (text accompanying notes I 06-16) .
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education that occurs within the four walls of the law school, he insisted on
the need to develop more realistic teaching materials that deepened the
superficial world of the ap}?ellate opinion by adding context, background,
and critical understanding . Legal education should break away from its
exclusive focus on the conceptual analysis of cases, Llewellyn believed, and
address more broadly the skills required of practicing lawyers.
He posits that the first goal of educational reform is to learn what
lawyers actually do, thereby revealing the capacities that should be
58
developed in law school. Recognizing that many lawyers play important
roles in political and civic life leads Llewellyn to cast the question broadly,
59
asking "[f]or Decent politics, what training do our law schools offer?"
Even those who devote their full professional life to practicing law do far
more than apply settled rules: "Not rules, but doing, is what we seek to train
60
men for."
After the first year of Socratic dialogue about case law,
Llewellyn urged that coursework involve detailed examinations of legal
problems in their full complexity, even at the cost of not covering the everexpanding universe of legal doctrine . Class materials should bring together
rich and diverse materials for assessment and debate, guided by Llewellyn's
emphatic rule: "better less, with real understanding, than more of the
ununderstood . .. The upshot seems to be that, within our [three year] timelimitation, we either integrate the background of social and economic fact
61
and policy, course by course, or fail of our job."
As with Vico, contemporary scholars have rediscovered Llewellyn's

57. Llewellyn acknowledged the benefits of the case method in the first year, but insisted that
upper division courses should involve detailed examinations of legal problems in their full
complexity, even if it resulted in less doctrin al coverage . He advocated that class materials in
upper division classes shoul d bring together detailed materials that are rich and diverse, so as to
provide a context for class discussion, and he was guided by the rule : "better less, with real
understanding, than more of the ununderstood." So-Called Legal Education, supra note 31, at
671.
58. Id. at 653-56.
59. Id. at 656.
60. Id. at 654.
61. Id. at 671. At the end of his career, Llewellyn was sounding the same theme :
To achieve the values of policy discussion in a modem context, the student needs enough
information about the particular rule under inquiry so that he can think instead of merely
palaver or emote. Off-the-cuff, bald of information, is not policy-discussion, it is vaporing..
. . This inescapably results in cutting, relentless cutting, of the doctrinal material covered. It
means highly intensified treatment of a vastly smaller body of rules. Cut down thus on scope
of the material, and your class-hours do indeed suffice to do the job of technical training,
they suffice also to enrich it with exploration of meaning, they suffice to go on into the arts
of policy-evaluation, of imagining curative measures, and of documentary and legislative
drafting: all merging in the pursuit of a true liberal art.
Liberal Art, supra note 35, at 385. As Llewellyn wryly reminds us, "I have never heard that
Socrates was seriously worried over 'coverage in class."' Id. at 387.
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message and seek to revive this thinking with a "new legal realism." 62 The
original realists focused on a realistic approach to appellate case law,
showing that the deductive model described in law school classrooms did
not match with reality. Just as Llewellyn looked beyond case law, scholars
of new legal realism seek to prepare students for the complex social world
63
they will inhabit as legal professionals.
These initiatives promise to
revive Llewellyn's insight into the need for radical reforms of legal
education.
The adherents of the new legal realism acknowledge that focusing on
the "empirical reality" of law and legal practice has the potential to devolve
64
into a reductionist empiricism.
This is where Llewellyn's legacy can
prove most helpful. Llewellyn's realism called for the rejection of
conceptual abstraction and the recovery of "reality," but he recognized that
the reality of legal practice is a web of interlocking discourses rather than a

62. The "New Legal Realism" effort began with a conference at the University of Wisconsin
in 2004 dedicated to extending the "law and society" thesis that legal studies should be grounded
in empirical reality rather than just conceptual rigor. Stewart Macaulay describes a two-pronged
research agenda: describing "law in action" (how law really works on the ground) and "living
law" (social constraints in addition to legal prescription). Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the
Old Legal Realism : "Things Ain't What They Used to Be", 2005 WISC. L. REV. 365, 385-86.
63. The Foreword to the Wisconsin symposium provides a detailed description of the need to
rethink legal education as part of the new legal realism :
What, then, would a new legal realist approach to teaching look like? Ultimately it
implies a call for sociolegal scholars to take the everyday practice of law seriously, and for
legal education to take seriously the fact that lawyers need to be able to systematically
analyze the real world in which they operate. Legal doctrine as reflected in statutes and case
law is essential to lawyering and must be at the core of what is taught in law school. But, in
teaching these materials, there is a tendency to treat law as a closed, logical system; students
are often essentially taught-if only by implication- to set aside their understanding of the
real world as they learn to "think like a lawyer."
A new legal realist approach to legal education would agree that the central focus of
legal education should be rigorous, analytic thinking, but would broaden what is included in
the substance of that analysis-not because it is interesting or 'enriching,' but because it is
core to the practice of law. It would merge theory and practice, teaching students to think
rigorously and systematically about the problems and situations they will encounter in the
practice of law. Traditional legal material is necessary but not sufficient for this project.
Decades of sociolegal scholarship have established that law is a social institution that does
not operate in a vacuum. Law is an open system, legal rules are not self-enforcing, and
informal processes often carry the day; thus, to practice law effectively, lawyers combine
their understanding of the law with their understanding of the real world.
. . . A new legal realist approach to legal education would take seriously the fact that
lawyers are continually engaged in what amount to mini research projects; they take in data
about the world around them, both experientially and from the reports of other people, and
process those data to come up with ideas about how things work and what consequences flow
from what actions.
Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword : Is it Time/or a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 335,
359-60 .
64. See Macaulay, supra note 62 , at 395-96; Stewart Macaulay , Contracts, New Legal
Realism, and Improving the Navigation of The Yellow Submarine, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1161, 1189
(2006).
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schema that could be described and then mastered. He was far more
pragmatic in outlook than many of his fellow realists-who tended to place
too much faith in the power of sociology, psychology, and economics-and
he rejected the stereotypical realist view that law should be subsumed into
65
the social science departments ofresearch universities.
In short, he favoured a commonsense strategy for research, based on a
realistic appraisal of the obstacles in the way of quick advance, such as
the cost, the lack of glamour in much of the work, and the shortage of
personnel with appropriate training. . . . [His] was a pragmatic and
sensible approach which could form the basis for a rounded strategy
for developing the subject, giving due re~ard both to the importance of
6
theory and to likely practical difficulties.
But simply accepting a chastened view of empirical studies is insufficient.
Llewellyn had made this point against some of his fellow realists, but he
understood that deeper questions were implicated and made a more farreaching philosophical point.
Dennis Patterson suggests that the substance of Llewellyn's
philosophical views anticipated Wittgenstein's later work: Llewellyn firmly
believed that philosophy leaves legal practice as it is, but that nevertheless
67
there is important work to be done within the practice.
Like Wittgenstein, Llewellyn believed that we can never escape the
realm of linguistic understanding. What this means for the critique of
law is that the ground of critique must be internal to legal practice
itself. The impossibility of transcending the (linguistic) limits of the
practice and reaching a point outside the practice from which to
critique it leaves only those within the practice as sources-and
68
evaluators--of criticism.
•
It is precisely this philosophical disposition that brought Llewellyn to the
rhetorical tradition and aligns his work with the message of Vico's oration.
One must attend to the reality of law and its social setting, and social
scientific inquiry is a necessary part of this endeavor; however, the "reality"
of law can never be captured solely by empirical measurement any more

65. Liberal Art, supra note 35, at 375-94; see Michael Ansaldi , The German Llewellyn, 58
BROOK.L. REV. 705, 711 (1992).
66. WILLIAMTWINING,KARL LLEWELLYNAND THE REALISTMOVEMENT196 {Univ. of
Oklahoma Press 1985) (1973). In light of the tremendous strides made by the social sciences in
the intervening years, Twining does ask whether Llewellyn's cautious approach had, by the end of
his career, become "complacent and unambitious in relation to the possibilities and the needs." Id.
67. Patterson, supra note 40, at 577-79.
68. Id. at 599-600.
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than by logical-deductive analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
The instrumental consciousness forged by contemporary legal practice
will assert itself with a vengeance against this Article: "What is the
solution?," and even more urgently, "What, exactly, is the problem?" Many
might argue that "legal education is designed to prepare students to be
lawyers, not philosophers or rhetoricians." This response demonstrates the
problem that this Article seeks to engage.
Legal education must expand its scope not because it answers an
instrumental need of the practicing bar, but because such an expansion will
undermine the instrumental ideology that pervades contemporary legal
practice. An expansion of scope in this respect means only to embrace the
full complexity of the practices that are reduced to caricatures of formal
reasoning and deductive logic, which, as many recognize, hold neither
explanatory nor normative power. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's account of
how one encounters the world generally rings especially true for the
experience of participating in legal practice. "The world is not what I think,
but what I live through. I am open to the world. I have no doubt that I am
69
in communication with it, but I do not possess it; it is inexhaustible." Law
professors cannot grasp legal reality and then dispense it to students in
carefully measured doses. Law is one modality of participating in social
reality, and that participation is complex and dynamic. Legal education
should begin to initiate students into this reality with a measure of selfunderstanding and self-criticism, rather than half-heartedly acknowledging
the implausibility of the standard accounts of legal reasoning but then
reinscribing them every day in the classroom.
Ironically, by escaping from the narrow and artificial conception of
legal education fostered by an instrumental view of the law, professors will
find that this new understanding better serves students in their goal to be
effective practitioners . Llewellyn's call for legal education as a liberal art is
similar to an undergraduate liberal arts education. Advocates tout it as being
intrinsically non-instrumental but then also claim that students are better
prepared to deal with the world in all its complexities-as a citizen,
economic agent, and member of society-as a result of their education.
Vico's rhetorical philosophy and Llewellyn's rhetorical conception of law
and legal education point the way toward a re-orientation of legal education
and a re-conceptualization of legal practice that revive elements of ancient
wisdom while also boldly addressing the needs of contemporary society.
69 . MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY , PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION , at xvi-xvii (Colin Smith

trans ., 5th impression 1970) (1962).
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By following this path , legal education can avoid failing its students.

